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Sodomy Statutes, the Ninth
Amendment, and the Aftermath of
Bowers v. Hardwick
INTRODUCTION
On June 30, 1986, the United States Supreme Court decided
Bowers v Hardwick,' which upheld the constitutionality of
the Georgia sodomy statute2 as applied to consensual sexual
acts between gay persons.' The five-to-four decision bitterly
divided the Court. The statute was attacked under the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 4 Hardwick was
the first case5 in which the Court agreed to consider whether
I Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986).
2 The statute at issue, GA. CODE Ai. § 16-6-2 (1984), provides, in pertinent
part, that:
(a) A person commits the offense of sodomy when he performs or submits
to any sexual act involving the sex organs of any person and the mouth
or anus of another.
(b) A person convicted of the offense of sodomy shall be punished by
impnsonment for not less than one nor more than 20 years.
See infra note 21.
1 Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. at 2843. A word or two about terminology is appropriate
at this point. Despite the fact that the word "gay" is sometimes used to refer exclusively
to male homosexuals (with the term "lesbian" applied to female homosexuals), this
Comment uses "gay" to refer to homosexuals of both genders. Moreover, the terms
"gay" and "homosexual" are used interchangeably. See Adamany, The Supreme Court
at the Frontier of Politics: The Issue of Gay Rights, 4 HAiniE L. Rav 185, 185 n.1
(1981).
Phrases such as "consensual sexual acts," "intimate association" and "homosexual
acts" are used interchangeably and refer to sexual acts involving consenting adults that
take place in pnvate. Unless otherwise indicated, these sexual acts would constitute a
violation of the Georgia sodomy statute. See supra note 2; cf. Pennsylvania v. Bonadio,
415 A.2d 47, 49 (Pa. 1980) (A difference exists between sexual acts involving consenting
adults taking place in private and acts that are public or in which there is a non-
consenting participant.).
4 "No State shall depnve any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law. " U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
In this Comment, any reference to the due process clause indicates the one contained
in the fourteenth amendment.
5 Prior to Hardwick, the closest the Court had come to deciding this issue was
in 1976, when the Court summarily affirmed a district court decision upholding the
constitutionality of the Virgima sodomy statute. Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403
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the "right to privacy" protected by the due process clause 6
encompassed a right to be free from governmental intrusion
in the area of consensual sexual relations between gay persons. 7
The Court resolved this issue in favor of the state restrictions
on consensual sexual acts.8
Nevertheless, the constitutional status of sodomy statutes
such as the one at issue in Hardwick9 is far from firmly
established, 10 and Hardwick certainly is not dispositive of the
issue." What is now established is that there is no right to
engage in homosexual activity protected by the right to privacy
inherent in the fourteenth amendment's due process clause. 2
However, the Hardwick Court specifically declined13 to con-
sider whether the statute in question violated the ninth amend-
ment, 14 the eighth amendment, 5 or the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment. 16 In light of the majority's re-
fusal to decide these issues, 7 a concurring opinion by Justice
Powell 8 practically inviting a challenge on different constitu-
F Supp. 1199, 1203 (E.D. Va. 1975), aff'd men., 425 U.S. 901 (1976). In 1984, the
Court granted certibran to a case in wich a New York law dealing with "deviate sexual
conduct" had been declared unconstitutional. The Court later dismissed the writ as
improvidently granted. New York v. Uplinger, 464 U.S. 812 (1983). The precedential
value of Doe had diminished in recent years. See, e.g., Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d
1202, 1207-10 (11th Cir. 1985), rev'd, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986). See generally Mandel v.
Bradley, 432 U.S. 173 (1977); Fusan v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379 (1975) (concermng the
precedential value of summary affirmances).
6 See infra notes 93-100 and accompanying text.
' Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. at 2843.
1 Id. at 2843-44. The Court expressed no view on the validity of the restriction
as it applies to heterosexual acts. Id. The Georgia statute, however, clearly encompasses
single and married heterosexuals within its prohibition. See supra note 2.
9 See supra note 2 for the text of the statute; see also infra note 21.
10 See infra notes 27-28 and sources cited therein.
" Hardwick was concerned solely with the constitutionality of sodomy statutes
under the due process clause. The constitutionality of these statutes under other provi-
sions of the Constitution is still undecided. See infra notes 13-20.
" Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. at 2843-44.
Id. at 2846 n.8.
' "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed
to deny or disparage others retained by the people." U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
,1 "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
16 "No State shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protec-
tion of the laws." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
7 Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. at 2846 n.8.
Id. at 2847 (Powell, J., concurring).
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tional grounds, 19 and the vehement nature of the dissents, 20 the
question whether sodomy statutes violate the ninth amendment
remains unresolved.
An evaluation of the constitutional status of sodomy
statutes2' under the ninth amendment, 22 the eighth amend-
ment, 23 the first amendment, 24 the equal protection clause, 25
and the supremacy clause, 26 is beyond the scope of this Com-
ment. 27 This Comment is limited to examining the constitu-
'1 "I agree with the Court that there is no substantive right under the Due
Process Clause-such as that claimed by respondent. This is not to suggest, however,
that respondent may not be protected by the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution."
Id.
, Both Justice Blackmun and Justice Stevens submitted forceful dissents. Id. at
2848 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), 2856 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justices Brennan and
Marshall joined both of these dissenting opimons.
21 Twenty-four states and the District of Columbia still have sodomy statutes. See
ALA. CODE § 13A-6-63-64 (1982); AIZ. REv STAT. ANN. § 13-1411 (1978 & Supp. 1984-
85); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1813 (1977); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3502 (1981); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 800.02 (West 1976); GA.. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1984); IDAHO CODE § 18-6605
(1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3505 (1981); Ky. REy STAT. ANN. § 510.100 (Baldwin
1978); LA. REv STAT. ANN. § 14:89.1 (West 1974 & Supp. 1985); MD. ANN. CODE art.
27, §§ 553-554 (1982 & Supp. 1984); MICH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. §§ 750.158, 750.338-
.338a (West 1968); MnNN. STAT. ANN. § 609.293 (West Supp. 1984); Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 97-29-59 (1973); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 566.090 (Vernon 1979); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-
5-505 (1983); NEv. REv. STAT. § 201.190 (1979); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-177 (1981);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 886 (West 1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-10-1 (1981); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 16-15-120 (Law. Co-op. 1977); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2-612 (1982); TEx.
[PENAL] CODE ANN. 21.06 (Vernon 1974); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-403 (1978 & Supp.
1983); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.12-361 (1982).
Whereas most of these statutes proscribe oral or anal sex between heterosexuals as
well as homosexuals, the following states limit their restriction to homosexual acts:
Arkansas, Kansas, Kentucky, Montana, Nevada and Texas.
2 See supra note 14.
23 See supra note 15.
u "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or pro-
hibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press;
or the nght of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I; see infra note 28.
25 See supra note 16.
26 This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the Land
any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.
U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, cI. 2; see infra note 28.
2 This Comment adopts a narrower approach. For summanes of the possible
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tional validity of sodomy statutes under the ninth amendment.28
Part I provides a brief overview of the ninth amendment. 29
Part II outlines the four most commonly proposed interpre-
tations of the ninth amendment. 30 Parts III, 31 IV,32 and V33
examine whether sodomy statutes would be unconstitutional
under each of these four possible interpretations of the ninth
amendment.
I. OVERVIEW OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT
The Court in Hardwick34 declined to consider whether so-
domy statutes violate the ninth amendment35 despite the fact
that in the lower court, Michael Hardwick challenged the Geor-
gia sodomy statute on mnth amendment grounds. 36
constitutional means of attack on sodomy statutes, see Lasson, Civil Liberties For
Homosexuals: The Law in Limbo, 10 U. DAYTON L. RPv 645, 650-64 (1985); Comment,
The Right of Privacy and Other Constitutional Challenges to Sodomy Statutes, 15 ToL.
L. REv. 811, 814-18 (1984).
2, It may be objected that this Comment should have been devoted to a more
viable means of constitutional attack, such as the equal protection clause. There are at
least two responses to this objection. First, if any provision of the Constitution needs
clarification and suggested means of interpretation, it certainly would be the ninth
amendment. See generally Note, The Uncertain Renaissance of the Ninth Amendment,
33 U. CHI. L. REv 814 (1966). Second, and similarly, the questions of how sodomy
statutes fare under other constitutional provisions have been treated extensively elsewhere
(with the exception of the "last-ditch" argument based on the supremacy clause). See,
e.g., Note, An Argument For the Application of Equal Protection Heightened Scrutiny
to Classification Based on Homosexuality, 57 S.CAL. L. REv 797 (1983-84) (equal
protection); Lasson, supra note 27, at 658-67 (first and eighth amendments); cf. Solem
v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 (1983) (disproportionate penalty can invalidate an otherwise
constitutional statute under eighth amendment); Mssissippi Umv. for Women v. Hogan,
458 U.S. 718, 729-30 (1982) (equal protection); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660,
666-67 (1962) (eighth amendment prohibits punishment of a "status"); NAACP v.
Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958) (first amendment "freedom of
association"); Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 1981 Y.B. EuR. CoNv. ON HUMAN Rioirs
(Eur. Comm'n on Human Rights) (judgment) (treaty provision invalidates domestic
sodomy statute); Comment, Human Rights in an International Context: Recognizing the
Right of Intimate Association, 43 Omo ST. L.J. 143, 155-62 (1982).
2 See infra notes 34-51 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 52-81 and accompanying text.
3' See infra notes 82-105 and accompanying text.
32 See infra notes 106-18 and accompanying text.
3 See infra notes 119-207 and accompanying text.
11 Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841, 2846 n.8 (1986).
15 See supra note 14 for the text of the ninth amendment.
36 Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202, 1212 (1985), rev'd, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986).
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The ninth amendment is often advanced in constitutional
litigation as a basis for attacking a particular governmental
practice, 3 7 but it is seldom, if ever, the sole basis on which a
court relies to declare such practice unconstitutional.3 8 In fact,
a majority of the Supreme Court has never based a decision
exclusively on the ninth amendment. 39 This curiosity is not
surprising particularly because "[n]o one knows what [the
ninth amendment] means." 40 Even Justice Robert Jackson, one
of the most renowned jurists ever to sit on the Supreme Court,41
described the ninth amendment as a "mystery "42
It is not clear that the ninth amendment places, or was
intended to place, any restrictions on the powers that may be
exercised by individual states. 43 Furthermore, it is open to
question whether the ninth amendment contains any "sub-
stance" at all, or is instead merely a redundancy adding "noth-
ing to the rest of the Constitution."" As Justice Stewart
explained:
31 See, e.g., International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961) (ninth
amendment used to challenge the union shop requirement of the Railway Labor Act);
Davis v. Lindsay, 321 F Supp. 1134 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (ninth amendment used to challenge
solitary confinement in a pnson); see also Ringold, The History of the Enactment of
the Ninth Amendment and its Recent Development, 8 TULSA L.J. 1, 55-57 (1972) (Table
of Cases).
11 See, e.g., supra note 37 and the cases cited therein; see also Kelsey, The Ninth
Amendment of the Federal Constitution, II IND. L.J. 309, 320 (1936). But see Stradley
v. Anderson, 349 F Supp. 1120, 1122 (D. Neb. 1972), aff'd, 478 F.2d 188 (8th Cir.
1973) (ninth amendment used to challenge the hair style and length regulations for
government employees).
" The closest the Court has come to relying exclusively on the ninth amendment
was in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), where Justice Goldberg (joined
by Chief Justice Warren and Justice Brennan) concurred in the Court's opinion based
on the ninth amendment. Tins concurrence, however, also involved the fourteenth
amendment. Id. at 487-93 (Goldberg, J., concurring); see infra notes 86-105 and accom-
panying text.
40 M. GOODMAN, Ti NINTm AMENDMENT: HISTORY, INTERPRETATION AND MEAN-
ING 1 (1981).
" Siegel & Rocco, Rating the Justices, in Ti FIRsT ONE HUNDRED JusTicEs 32-
51 (A. Blaustem ed. 1978).
42 M. GOODMAN, supra note 40, at 59.
," See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 519-20 (Black, J., dissenting); see also Redlich, Are
There "Certain Rights Retained By the People"', 37 N.Y.U. L. REv 787, 805-06
(1962). See generally M. GoODMAN, supra note 40.
" E. DUMBAULD, Tim BILL OF RIGHTs 65 (1957).
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The Ninth Amendment, like its companion, the Tenth,45
which this Court held "states but a truism that all is retained
which has not been surrendered" was framed by James
Madison and adopted by the States simply to make clear
that the adoption of the Bill of Rights did not alter the plan
that the Federal Government was to be a government of
express and limited powers, and that all rights and powers
not delegated to it was retained by the people and the indi-
vidual States. 46
It is clear that the ninth amendment could not be used as
an independent basis for striking down sodomy statutes if it
had been firmly established that the ninth amendment did not
apply to the states47 or that it is a mere truism. 48 The Supreme
Court has never so held;49 thus, the question is still technically
open. 50 Apart from characterizing it as a truism, there are four
alternative interpretations of the ninth amendment that remain
available.51
41 "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor pro-
hibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."
U.S. CONST. amend. X.
4' Griswold, 381 U.S. at 529-30 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v.
Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941)) (emphasis in original). For a persuasive refutation of
Stewart's position, see J. ELY, DEMOCiACY AND DISTRUST 34-36 (1980) and sources cited
therein.
47 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 539.
41 In the most definitive ruling to date on the tenth amendment, Garcia v. San
Antonio Metro Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985), the Court noted the truistic nature
of the tenth amendment, and upheld a statute against a tenth amendment challenge. Id.
at 554. The Court stated that the federalism concerns that are the subject matter of the
tenth amendment are best left to the political process for resolution. Id. at 552. Despite
its holding the Court left reason to believe that the tenth amendment is not a "true"
truism when it intimated that there might still be Congressional actions-purportedly
based on the commerce clause-that would infnnge upon state authority. See id. at 556.
11 See B. PATTERSON, Tit FORGOTTEN Nn-riH AMENDMENT 34 (1955); see also
Ringold, supra note 37, at 54.
-1 See B. PATTERSON, supra note 49, at 35.
"I There are, of course, other conceivable interpretations. However, the four that
are discussed in this Comment have been utilized in some manner by the courts or
received support from commentators. There is a fifth approach that is not discussed:
that the mnth amendment was "intended to make clear that despite the Bill of Rights
Congress could create further rights, or that state legislatures (or common law courts)
could do so, or that a state could do so in its own constitution." J. ELY, supra note
46, at 37. Like the view that the ninth amendment is a truism, this approach demes any
substantive content to the mnth amendment, and therefore could provide no basis for




II. FOUR ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATIONS OF THE NINTH
AMENDMENT
A. Ninth Amendment Applicable to States by Analogy
The first approach5 2 to the ninth amendment is that it is
directly applicable to only the federal government, yet it in-
directly circumscribes state power by providing a standard
against which state action is judged by analogy -3 Proponents
of this view54 argue that the ninth amendment, while neither
directly applicable to the states nor an independent source of
protected rights, nevertheless "shows a belief of the Consti-
tution's authors that fundamental rights exist that are not
expressly enumerated in the first eight amendments and an
intent that the list of rights included there not be deemed
exhaustive." 55 The ninth amendment protects against encroach-
ment upon these fundamental rights by the federal govern-
ment.5 6 By analogy, the "liberty ' 57 protected by the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment 5s protects the same fun-
damental rights from state encroachment.5 9
52 This approach will hereinafter be referred to as either "the first interpretation"
or the "analogy approach."
51 See supra notes 43-48 and accompanying text.
m The most notable proponent of this view was Justice Goldberg, as evidenced by
his concurrence in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 487-93 (1965).
11 Id. at 492 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
56 Id.
5" A distinction should be made between the liberty interests textually protected by
the due process clause and the much broader conception of liberty that is protected by
the entire Bill of Rights. The reference here is, of course, to the former.
11 See supra note 4 for the text of the due process clause.
11 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 492 (Goldberg, J., concurring). Justice Goldberg gave
several tests by which one could ascertain whether an asserted right is "fundamental."
One is to "look to the 'traditions and [collective] conscience of our people' to determine
whether a principle is 'so rooted [there] as to be ranked as fundamental.' " Id. at
493 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)). A second "is whether
a right involved is of such a character that it cannot be demed without violating those
'fundamental principles of liberty and justice which He at the base of all our civil and
political institutions.' " Id. at 493 (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932)).
A third test looks to "liberty [as it] 'gains content from the emanations of specific
[constitutional] guarantees' and 'from experience with the requirements of a free soci-
ety.' " Id. (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 517 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting)).
1987-88]
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B. Penumbra Theory as Providing a Basis for the Right to
Privacy
The second approach6° to the ninth amendment is much more
familiar, since it has been utilized by the Supreme Court. 61 This
interpretation views the ninth amendment as a provision which,
although not necessarily incorporated directly into the due proc-
ess clause of the fourteenth amendment, 62 contains a penumbra
of rights which, when considered in conjunction with the pen-
umbras of the first, 63 third,64 fourth, 65 and fifth6 amendments
provide a constitutional basis for a right to privacy 67 The four-
teenth amendment's due process clause68 provides the mechanism
whereby this right is protected from infringement by the states. 69
C. Incorporation of Ninth Amendment into Due Process Clause
The third approach7" concedes that the ninth amendment
originally applied to only the federal government, but neverthe-
61 This approach will hereinafter be referred to as "the second interpretation" or
"the penumbra approach."
61 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 147-64 (1973) (state statute prohibiting
almost all abortions struck down as a violation of the right of privacy); Griswold, 381
U.S. at 484 (state statute prohibiting the use of contraceptives by marred couples struck
down as violating the right of privacy); see also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 452-
55 (1972) (state statute prohibiting the distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons
struck down as a violation of equal protection); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564-
66 (1969) (state statute prohibiting the mere possession of obscene material in one's
home struck down as violating the right of privacy).
62 See supra note 4 for the text of the due process clause.
6 See supra note 24 for the text of the first amendment.
" "No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the
consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law."
U.S. CoNsT. amend. III.
61 The penumbra embracing a zone of privacy is implied from the affirmation of
"[t]he right of the people to be secure in their personal houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures. "U.S. CONsT. amend. IV; see Griswold,
381 U.S. at 484.
6 The penumbra embracing a zone of privacy is created by the self-incrimination
clause: "[n]o person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself." U.S. CONST. amend. V; see Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484.
67 See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484; see also Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841,
2843-44 (1986); supra note 61 and cases cited therein.
" See supra note 4 for the text of the due process clause.
See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 481.




less argues that the due process clause7' incorporated the mnth
amendment and thereby made it directly applicable to the states.72
Proponents of this view argue that the criterion for determimng
whether an asserted right is one that falls within the protection
of the mnth amendment is whether the asserted right is "an
essential ingredient of the free society established by our Consti-
tution."73 This is ascertained by examimng whether the asserted
right is:
adjacent to, or analogous to, the pattern of rights which we
find [enumerated] in the Constitution. [The ninth amend-
ment] should not be used as a substitute for a vigorous
application of those rights which are specified in the Consti-
tution, or for the adoption of rights which bear no connec-
tion to our constitutional scheme. To define the rights
"retained by the people," judges must, of course make per-
sonal judgements. 74
If the asserted right falls within that category, a statute in-
fringing upon it would be unconstitutional unless the state can
show "overwhelming proof of necessity and the chance of no
other and less burdensome means to achieve [its] objectives." 75
D Ninth Amendment Originally Directly Applicable to the
States
The fourth approach 76 to the ninth amendment maintains
that from its inception, it has been, and was intended to be,
directly applicable to the states, and serves as both a restriction
on the states' powers and an independent source of individual
rights. 77 Proponents of this view argue that a right that falls
7, See supra note 4 for the text of the due process clause.
7 See Redlich, supra note 43, at 805-06.
7" Id. at 812.
7, Id.
73 Id.
76 This approach will hereinafter be referred to as "the fourth interpretation" or
"the direct application approach."
" An elaboration of the basis of this argument, with its necessary reliance on
historical rewards, is beyond the scope of this Comment. For a detailed analysis that
concludes that the ninth amendment was intended to restrict both the federal government




within the protection of the ninth amendment is one that is an
"inherent human right and is one of the bases required for
the existence of a free people." '7 8 These rights, moreover, are
not limited to what may have been considered "inherent hu-
man rights" at the time the ninth amendment was adopted. 79
It applies equally to those rights that "will be revealed and
become apparent in the future." 0 State restrictions on such
rights must survive heightened scrutiny by the courts. 8'
III. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SODOMY STATUTES UNDER
EITHER THE "ANALOGY" OR "PENUMBRA" APPROACHES TO
THE NINTH AMENDMENT
The "analogy" 8 2 and "penumbra" 3 interpretations of the
ninth amendment differ only slightly 84 One could argue that
these are mere differences in semantics; 5 therefore, they are
discussed together
The problem that would result from using the ninth amend-
ment as the basis for a constitutional attack under either of
these approaches surfaces immediately Both implicate the due
process clause,8 6 and the only substantive right relevant to this
issue that has ever been protected under either of these ap-
proaches is the right to privacy 87 A challenge to sodomy
71 Id. at 51.
11 Id. The ninth amendment was drafted by James Madison in the First Congress.
1 ANNAiS OF CONGRESS 452 (J. Goales & Seaton eds. 1834).
10 B. PATTERSON, supra note 49, at 55.
S, Id. at 51-56.
82 See supra notes 52-59 and accompanying text.
1 See supra notes 60-69 and accompanying text.
4 Both approaches have been limited generally to cases involving the right to
privacy, and it is difficult to conceive of a situation where the two approaches could
reach different conclusions. Compare Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-86
(1965) (majority opinion) (second approach) with id. at 487-93 (Goldberg, J., concurring)
(first approach).
S See, e.g., Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F Supp. 1199, 1205 (E.D.
Va. 1975) (Merhige, J., dissenting), aff'd, 425 U.S. 901 (1976).
86 See supra note 4 for the text of the due process clause.
" Some lower courts have found a few rights that are protected by the ninth
amendment that arguably do not fall within the right to privacy. None of these rights
are relevant to this discussion. See, e.g., Dewees v. Palm Beach, 812 F.2d 1365 (11th
Cir. 1987) (right "to dress and foster health through athletic expression"); Bishop v.
Colaw, 450 F.2d 1069, 1075 (8th Cir. 1971) (right to govern one's personal appearance
while attending high school). But cf. United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 95-
96 (1947).
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statutes under either approach would necessitate an assertion
that the right to privacy, as protected by the due process
clause 88 and/or the penumbras of the Bill of Rights, 89 extends
to consensual homosexual acts. 90 However, this was precisely
the contention that the Court rejected in Hardweck.91
The Hardwick Court limited the right of privacy 92 to only
those situations involving child rearing, 93 education,94 procre-
ation, 95 family relationships,96 marriage,97 contraception,98 and
abortion. 99 Justice White stated that he disagreed with the
assertion that "the Court's prior cases have construed the
Constitution to confer a right to privacy that extends to homo-
sexual sodomy "1 00
Thus, Hardwick has definitivelyo1i established that sodomy
statutes do survive constitutional muster under either of the
See, e.g., infra notes 93-i00 and cases cited therein.
" See, e.g., Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484.
9 Prior to Hardwick, this seemed to be the most viable constitutional argument
against sodomy statutes. See generally Ludd, The Aftermath of Doe v. Commonwealth's
Attorney: In Search of the Right to be Let Alone, 10 U. DAYTON L. REv 705 (1985).
91 Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841, 2843 (1986).
92 Id. at 2843-44; see Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977) (Court
lists decisions defining areas to which the right to privacy applies).
'7 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401-03 (1923).
Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).
91 Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 537 (1942).
9 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 167 (1944).
97 Loving v. Virgima, 388 U.S. 1, 10-12 (1967).
" Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 452-55 (1972); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484.
1, Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 106 S. Ct.
2169, 2180-83 (1986); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 147-64 (1973).
1** Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. at 2843.
Mi The use of the word "definitively" is, of course, a bit misleading, since the
Court always retains the option of overruling Hardwick in the future. Stare decisis
notwithstanding, Justice Blackmun, in his dissent, candidly points out that the Court,
on at least one occasion, has overruled a decision only three years after it was rendered
in West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (overruling Minerville
School Dist. v. Gobites, 310 U.S. 586 (1940)). Justice Blackmun stated:
I can only hope that here, too, the Court soon will consider its analysis
and conclude that depriving individuals of the right to choose for them-
selves how to conduct their intimate relationships poses a far greater threat
to the values most deeply rooted in our nation's history than tolerance of
nonconformity could ever do I think the Court today betrays those
values.
Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. at 2856 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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first two approaches to the ninth amendment.10 2 The Court has
discussed only these two approaches in its prior decisjons.' 03
For this reason, the Court's statement that it was expressing
no opinion on the constitutionality of sodomy statutes under
the ninth amendment104 was misleading, at the very least, unless
the Court would be receptive to a different interpretation of
the ninth amendment.105
IV THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SODOMY STATUTES UNDER
THE INCORPORATION APPROACH TO THE NINTH AMENDMENT
The "incorporation" approach'0° to the ninth amendment
encounters many of the same problems as do the first two
approaches. 0 7 This is because this view also implicates the due
process clause. 08 Moreover, the incorporation of the ninth
amendment into the due process clause might arguably add
nothing to the due process clause that is relevant to this issue'0 9
except the right of privacy This right has already been held
to be encompassed within the fourteenth amendment." 0 There-
fore, Hardwick would preclude a successful ninth amendment
attack on sodomy statutes under the "incorporation ap-
proach.""' The Hardwick Court's decision under the due pro-
cess clause would also necessarily have decided the issue under
102 Under these approaches the standards for the due process clause and the mnth
amendment are identical.
103 See supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text.
114 Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. at 2846.
305 See infra notes 120-71 and accompanying text.
106 See supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
107 See supra notes 82-105 and accompanying text.
"I See supra note 4 for the text of the due process clause.
109 See supra note 87.
110 Arguably, such incorporation would encompass even less than the full right to
privacy, because proponents of this interpretation have argued that the rights protected
by the ninth amendment should be limited to only those rights that are "analogous" to
the enumerated rights. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 168 (1973) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 530 (1965) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
See generally Ely, Foreword: On Discovering Fundamental Values, 92 HARv L. Ra, 5
(1978).
"' Attacks under this approach would fail for the same reasons that attacks under
either the first or second approaches would fail. See supra notes 82-105 and accompa-
nying text.
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the Ninth Amendment,' 2 despite the Court's assertion to the
contrary M3 Once again, this may signify that the Court would
be receptive to a different interpretation of the ninth amend-
ment. "1 4
However, it is possible that the incorporation of the ninth
amendment into the fourteenth amendment carries with it rights
broader than, or in addition to, the right to privacy "5 This
works against the adoption of this approach to the ninth
amendment, for such an interpretation would necessitate a
complete overhaul of constitutional law under the due process
clause," 6 and while those "additional rights ' 1 7 may be rele-
vant to the constitutionality of sodomy statutes, it appears
extremely unlikely that the Court would be willing to broaden
the scope of the due process clause through the incorporation
of the ninth amendment." 8
V THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SODOMY STATUTES UNDER
THE "DIRECT APPLICATION" APPROACH TO THE NINTH
AMENDMENT
Only the "direct application" ' 9 approach remains to be
examined. Of the four possible interpretations, 20 this approach
-,2 As under the first and second approach, there would be an identity between the
due process clause and the ninth amendment.
M Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841, 2846 n.8 (1986).
"4 See infra notes 119-42 and accompanying text.
"5 An attempted enumeration of what these additional rights might be is both
beyond the scope of this Comment and antithetical to the purpose underlying the nmnth
amendment. See infra notes 128-41 and accompanying text.
M6 This point can be made with but one example: suppose the Court had held
earlier that one did not have a right under the due process clause to indulge in intoxicating
substances. However, were the Court to incorporate the ninth amendment into the due
process clause and carry with it additional rights beyond those already present in the
right to privacy, a litigant legitimately could ask whether he or she now had the right
to indulge in intoxicating substances under the due process clause. All decisions in which
it has been held that a right was not protected by the due process clause once again
would become open questions.
"7 Additional rights potentially can gain constitutional protection without involving
the due process clause. See infra notes 167-71 and accompanying text.
"8 It is worth pointing out that Justice Black, the most famous proponent of the
"total incorporation theory," did not consider the ninth amendment to have been
incorporated into the fourteenth amendment by the due process clause. See Griswold,
381 U.S. at 519-20 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting).
"9 For a list of possible ways to challenge sodomy statutes see supra notes 27-28
and accompanying text.
120 See supra note 51.
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is the most likely to provide a means by which sodomy statutes
could be challenged successfully under the ninth amendment. 121
Holding that the ninth amendment has always been applicable
directly to the states would remove the necessity of implicating
the due process clause. 2 2 Furthermore, the basis of constitu-
tional attack would not be limited to the right of privacy 123
In addition, there would be no n6ed to delve into the
speculative realm of "original intent, 12 4 because the words of
the ninth amendment itself125 presuppose that determination of
"rights retained by the people" will depend on judicial deci-
sion-making on a case-by-case basis according to the present
state of society 126 Insistence that the Court remain loyal to
"original intent" when construing the Constitution'27 would
pose no problem. The "original intent" behind the ninth
amendment was to provide a constitutional basis for the prop-
osition that "the exceptions in the constitution, made in
favor of particular rights, shall not be so construed as to
diminish the just importance of other rights retained by the
people, or as to enlarge the powers delegated by the Consti-
tution. ' 12 Attempting to ascertain what the framers considered
to be reserved rights actually runs counter to their intent.1 29
Their intent was that no enumeration of protected rights-in
the Constitution, in their own minds, 130 or contemplated by
,21 See infra notes 172-207 and accompanying text.
'2 See supra note 4 for the text of the due process clause.
123 See infra notes 167-184 and accompanying text.
,24 Justices, of course, vary greatly on how much emphasis they, as individuals,
place on "original intent." A discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of the
"interpretivist" (as opposed to "nonmterpretivist") school of constitutional interpreta-
tion is beyond the scope of this Comment. The question of "original intent" is discussed,
but the author should not be construed to be endorsing the "interpretivist" school. See
generally J. ELY, supra note 46, at 1-72; Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original
Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REv. 204 (1980); Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Consti-
tution?, 27 STAN. L. REv 703 (1975); Linde, Judges, Critics, and the Realist Tradition,
82 YALE L.J. 227 (1972); Wellington, History and Morals in ConstitutionalAdjudication,
97 HARv. L. REv 326 (1983).
2I See supra note 14 for the text of the ninth amendment.
'26 See supra, B. PATrERSON note 49, at 54-56.
'2 See supra note 124 and sources cited therein.
,2, See ANNALS oF CoNGRnss, supra note 79, at 452. This was a portion of Madison's
original draft of the ninth amendment.
12 See id.
I" See infra note 136.
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the society of 178913'-would be utilized as a means to restrict
or limit unenumerated rights. It is irrelevant whether an omis-
sion was due to oversight, 132 a need for conciseness, 133 the
frailty and finite nature of the human mind,134 ignorance, 135
impossibility,136 or even a contrary belief prevalent at the time
the ninth amendment was drafted.137 One may reasonably and
accurately state that the intent of the framers was that their
intent not be considered in determining what rights are pro-
tected by the ninth amendment. 138
Equally significant to the foregoing consideration is the
fact that utilization of the ninth amendment under this inter-
"' Mhe natural rights of Americans should not be static and fixed as of the date
of the adoption of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. To interpret
the Ninth Amendment in this manner would take it out of its clearly
intended meaning. Such an interpretation would mean that there was a
cutoff date-at the time of the adoption of the Bill of Rights; that prior to
that date rights of natural endowment were recognized, but after, said date
only such rights as were enumerated or known to exist would be protected.
This interpretation destroys the distinction between "enumerated" and
"unenumerated", and restricts its meaning to be read as "such enumerated
rights as are now known to exist."
B. PATTEMON, supra note 49, at 53.
"' The framers were aware that they were neither omnscient nor omnipotent. Their
refusal to use a code-like format and the various ambiguities they placed vithin the
Constitution manifest this awareness. The interpretation and application of the ambi-
guities to particular factual contexts were left to those who actually would confront
those factual realities in the future. See id. at 57-65.
"I The Constitution was relatively short in comparison to state constitutions. This
was intentional, as the framers were creating a Constitution that they intended to endure
for ages. They, therefore, avoided the rigidity and length of a code-like format. See M.
GOODMAN, supra note 40, at 53-55.
"I See supra note 132.
13S Id.
"3 For example, the framers had no intent with respect to whether one had a right
to federal funds for use in performing open-heart surgery; such a phenomenon was
medically impossible at that time. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 489-90
(1954) (framers had no intent with respect to public education because the institution
was not yet in existence in most states).
'"See supra note 131.
" Id. "IT]here is no indication that [the framers] expected or intended future
interpreters to refer to any extratextual intention revealed in the convention's secretly
conducted debates." Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARv
L. Rav. 885 (1985). "It is commonly assumed that the 'interpretive intention' of the
Constitutional framers was that the Constitution would be construed in accordance with
what future interpreters could gather of the framers' own purposes, expectations, and
intentions. Inquiry shows that assumption to be incorrect." Id. at 948.
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pretation is in no way inconsistent with judicial precedent, 139
and would not entail a need to overrule or even distinguish
prior cases.140 Nor would such a utilization alter-either by
broadening or circumscribing-existing constitutional doctrine
under any of the Constitution's other provisions. 14' Indeed,
the fact that the ninth amendment remains virtually umnter-
preted (perhaps more so than any other constitutional provi-
sion that concerns individual rights)142 dictates in favor of
adopting this approach to the ninth amendment. 143 The Justices
of the Supreme Court essentially have the constitutional equiv-
alent of a tabula rasa upon which they are authorized-even
commanded-to inscribe constitutional protection to unenu-
merated rights as the opportumties are presented. 1'
Several questions remain concerning the interpretation of
the ninth amendment under this approach. 145 Perhaps the most
important question is the standard by which the Court should
ascertain which rights are protected by the ninth amendment. 46
What restraints does the ninth amendment impose upon judges
to prevent them from substituting pure value judgments for
constitutional protections, thereby functioning as "Platomc
guardians?"' 47  What prevents the Court from becoming a
"superlegislature?"' 41 The answer to these questions undoubt-
edly will be unsatisfactory to many 149 There is a necessary
"19 See supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text.
140 Id.
141 Utilization of the ninth amendment alone obviously does not entail the use of
any other constitutional provisions. But see supra notes 86-112 and accompanying text.
142 Arguably, the sole exception to this assertion is the third amendment, which
also has remained virtually uninterpreted. See supra note 64 for the text of the third
amendment.
141 See supra notes 139-40, 37-42 and accompanying text.
I" See B. PATTERSON, supra note 49, at 52-54.
'41 This Comment does not purport to deal with all the ramifications resulting from
the utilization of the ninth amendment under the fourth interpretation. See generally B.
PATTERSON, supra note 49; Paust, Human Rights and the Ninth Amendment: A New
Form of Guarantee, 60 CoRNmL L. Rav 231 (1975).
'46 See infra notes 167-71 and accompanying text.
',7 L. HAND, Tim BrL OF RIGHTS 70 (1958).
141 Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423 (1952).
149 The concept of allowing Justices to pronounce constitutional doctrine without
being confined to strict and specific constitutional provisions has alarmed and aroused
some of our most renowned jurists. See, e.g., Roclun v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 175
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antagonism between authorizing the judiciary to provide con-
stitutional protection to rights not enumerated specifically in
the Constitution and mandating that members of the judiciary
act as judges and not as legislators. The former is commanded
by the ninth amendment,1 50 while the latter is required by the
principles underlying the doctrine of separation of powers15 1
and inherent in the concept of democratic government. 52 To
some extent, this conflict is irreconcilable. There are at least
six considerations 53 that should remove or reduce public anx-
iety if this approach to the ninth amendment were to be adopted
by the Court. 154
First, a certain degree of inconsistency or fundamental
conflict in the mandates of the Constitution is permissible-
even desirable. 5 5 There should be no fear that one will override
or swallow the other; indeed, each serves to provide a healthy
check on the other 156 Second, it is a well-established principle
in free societies that situations involving either the protection
of an asserted individual right or suppression of such a right
generally should be resolved in favor of the individual. 5 7
Third, the framers of the Constitution entrusted a great
deal of discretion to the judiciary, and also entrusted the courts
to exercise this discretion reasonably and responsibly 158 More-
(1952) (Black, J., concurring); Tyson & Bro. v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 446 (1927)
(Holmes, J., dissenting); see also Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf. A Comment on Roe
v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 943-49 (1973).
11 See supra note 14.
M See generally Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); U.S. CoNsT.
art. I, §§ 3, 7, 8; art. II, §§ 2-4; art. III, §§ 1-2.
" See generally, J. ELY, supra note 46.
" See mfra notes 155-71 and accompanying text.
14 As stated before, there is no judicial impediment to the Court's adoption of
this approach. See supra notes 139-44 and accompanying text.
"I For example, there is a fundamental conflict between the "establishment" and
"free exercise" clauses in the first amendment. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962);
see also supra note 24 for the text of the first amendment.
"1 The fact that a system of "checks and balances" is built into the Constitution
provides support for the proposition that the framers perceived such checks as healthy.
See supra note 151.
"I "Mankind are greater gainers by suffering each other to live as seems good to
themselves, than by compelling each to live as seems good to the rest." ML, ON
LimERTY 17 (1976) (J. Gray ed.).
"I Two obvious examples of a tremendous exercise of discretion by the Court are
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over, the process whereby one becomes a member of the
judiciary 159 presumably insures that only those individuals who
can exercise their power responsibly will actually be appointed.
History provides some additional reassurance in that the Court,
by and large, has not exercised its discretion in an egregious
manner 160 Fourth, if the judiciary oversteps its authority, the
people have a significant check on the judiciary in the power
of constitutional amendment, 16 1 and, in extreme cases, the
power of impeachment. 16 2
Fifth, the framers intended, and the.people have a right to
expect that every provision in the Constitution have some
purpose and meaning. 163 If the ninth amendment were reduced
to a truism 64 or relegated to a position of merely protecting a
right to privacy protected elsewhere in the Constitution, 65 the
ninth amendment would be surplusage.166
Sixth, there are standards by which the ninth amendment
may be interpreted under this approach that provide both a
framework for its utilization and circumscribe the ability of
the judiciary to manipulate the Constitution to accomodate
their personal policy preferences.1 67 This country was founded
upon and owes its existence to the premises that "all men are
created equal, that they are endowed with certain
[i]nalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and
the Pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these rights, Govern-
Swan v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 28-32 (1971) (Court ordered
busing of children to achieve integration in public schools) and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 162-69 (1972) (Court fashioned constitutional guidelines for abortions around the
trimesters of a pregnancy).
M See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
160 There have been, of course, individual decisions with which large numbers of
people have disagreed or have been outraged (most notably Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60
U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856) and, in recent times, Roe, 410 U.S. at 113); however, the
writer feels that few can say honestly that the Court oversteps its authority often.
161 See U.S. CONST. art. V
162 See U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 3, cI. 6-7
16 See Kelsey, supra note 38, at 320.
' See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 529-30 (1965) (Stewart, J., dissenting)
(stating that the mnth amendment is no more potent than the tenth amendment).
163 See supra notes 82-118 and accompanying text.
"6 See id.
167 See mnfra text accompanying notes 168-71.
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ments are instituted among Men. "168 Given these premises,
the unenumerated rights protected by the ninth amendment
must be those which follow logically from these basic and
fundamental principles in the context of the present state of
society 169 Because of the quasi-fundamental nature of such
rights, 170 restrictions on them must be subjected to some level
of heightened scrutiny by the courts.17 1
The only determination remaining is whether sodomy stat-
utes impermissibly infringe upon the unenumerated rights pro-
tected by the ninth amendment as interpreted under this
approach.
That gay persons constitute a significant percentage of
society is unquestionable. 172 Equally clear is the proposition
that absent a special factor such as lack of majority,173 criminal
conviction, 174 or military service, 175 all members of society are
afforded the protections and guarantees of the Constitution. 7 6
These protections include the ninth amendment's protection of
certain unenumerated rights, as ascertained under proper
standards. Therefore, if the asserted right of intimate associ-
ation for gay persons is protected by the ninth amendment,
such a right must follow logically and necessarily from the
initial premises that form the framework for analysis under
the ninth amendment.177
I" The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
169 See B. PAttERSON, supra note 49, at 52-54. Patterson describes the ninth
amendment as a "growing philosophy." Id.
170 See id.
"I See id. at 55.
'7 Gay persons constitute anywhere from 8% to 15% of the population. See A.
KiNsEy, W POMEROY & C. MARTIN, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN TEE HuMAN MALE 650-51
(1948); A. KiNsEY, W POMEROY, C. MARTIN & E. GEaARD, SExuAL BEIAVIOR IN THE
HumAN FEAL 473-74 (1953).
"7 See, e.g., Pnnce v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 169-70 (1944).
1 See, e.g., Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 345-47 (1981) (holding that harsh
prison conditions "are part of the penalty that crimnal offenders pay for their offenses
against society").
171 See, e.g., Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388, 1392 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (stating
that the military need for discipline "justifying restnctions that go beyond the needs of
civilian society has repeatedly been made clear by the Supreme Court").
76 See U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
"7 See supra notes 167-71 and accompanying text.
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The fact that homosexuals, like heterosexuals, regard their
choice of sexual partners as clearly personal and important
cannot be disputed.178 Both homosexuals and heterosexuals
find it essential to their "happiness" and well-being to be free
to choose their partner for consensual sexual relations. 7 9 A
state-imposed deprivation of that choice amounts to a restric-
tion on one's right to "the pursuit of happiness" protected by
the ninth amendment. 8 0 Sodomy statutes represent precisely
such a deprivation. By this proscription, the state prohibits
one from pursuing lifestyles and relationships that seem
natural 8' to him or her and that are essential to one's sense
of self-worth and fulfillment as a human being. 8 2 It is obvious
171 It has even been argued that homosexual relationships are potentially superior
to heterosexual relationships. See S. KERN, ANATOMY AND DESTNY: A CULTuRAL His-
TORY OF THE HUMAN BODY 149-52 (1975) (detailing arguments various commentators
have advanced for the superiority of homosexuality).
The author of this Comment wishes to note that he disagrees with this assertion.
Arguments for the "superiority" of a particular sexual orientation are, in the author's
opinion, doomed from the start-premised, as they inevitably are, on overbroad gener-
alization, stereotyping, and inescapable subjectivity. My point is that, wholly apart from
the validity or invalidity of sanctions against a particular sexual practice, it is clear
nonetheless that a person's decision whether and with whom he or she engages in sexual
relations (or desires to do so) is inherently intensely personal.
179 The emotional, psychological, and even physiological damages that flow as a
consequence of sexual repression-whether induced by external or internal forces-has
been studied extensively and is well-docurhented. For discussion of this issue and/or
brief summaries of some of these studies see M. CALDERONE & E. JOHNSON, THE FAMLY
BOOK ABOUT SExUALIrrY 112-20 (1981); H. COLTON, OUR SExuAL REvOLUTION 23-43
(1971); S. KERN, supra note 178, at 56-66, 169-220.
"~ See supra notes 167-71 and accompanying text.
zSI The word "natural" is used here in what has been called the "realistic" sense
of "nature"- what is "natural" to a particular individual is what is characteristic of
him or her, In this context, to act "unnaturally" is to act uncharactenstically. See J.
BoswELL, CHisTiANITY, SocIAL TOLERANcE, AND HoMosExuALITY 11 (1980). The use of
the word may perhaps reflect poor judgment. In statements regarding homosexuality,
the meanings of "natural" and "unnatural" vary widely according to the concept of
"nature" to which they are related. Often the pertinent "concept of nature" can not
be ascertained, and "natural" and "unnatural" then become virtually meaningless-all
too often functioning as self-serving bases for physiological and/or theological attacks
upon (or defenses of) homosexuality. See generally id. at 11-15. No conclusion can be
drawn yet on the question of whether homosexuality is "physiologically natural." See
Birke, Is Homosexuality Hormonally Determined?, in PHmOsOPHY AND HoMosExUALITY
35-47 (N. Koertge ed. 1985); Ruse, Are There Gay Genes? Sociobiology and Homosex-
uality, in PinLosoPiiY AND HOMosExUALITY 5-32 (N. Koertge ed. 1985). For a suggestion
that homosexuality is "ecologically natural," see H. COLTEN, supra note 179, at 54.
"1 See supra note 179 and sources cited therein.
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that state action of this nature infringes upon one's funda-
mental right""' to pursue happiness according to his or her own
nature and would be unconstitutional under this interpretation
of the ninth amendment, unless such a restriction could with-
stand heightened scrutiny by the courts. 1
84
Sodomy statutes, like all statutes, restrict "liberty" in some
manner 185 Therefore, it is useful to examine when "liberty"
may be restricted legitimately by the government. John Stuart
Mill, in his eminent and apposite work, On Liberty,186 asserted
that liberty could be restricted only if such restriction is nec-
essary to prevent harm to others. 8 7 Similarly, the Supreme
Court requires a greater showing of interest from state govern-
ments when the liberty interests being infringed upon are fun-
damental rights, and employs a "strict scrutiny" approach 88
or an "intermediate" approach. 89 Under the strict scrutiny
approach, the state action will not be sustained unless the
government can show that it is pursuing a "compelling" or
"overriding" end, and the statute is "necessary" to promote
those interests.190 The lesser, "intermediate" standard requires
that statutes have a "substantial relationship to an important
governmental objective."' 91
I8 See supra notes 167-71 and accompanying text.
'u See infra notes 188-207 and accompanying text.
"u The exceptions to this assertion are statutes that merely make "pronounce-
ments." An example is a statute declaring November 13 to be "Pumpkin Day."
I" Mill's ideas concerning liberty are respected widely in the free world. His
philosophy has influenced many groups that work for the advancement of Civil Liberties.
See POLICY GumE OF T AMmucAN Civii LsaERTms UNIoN 18-21 (1985).
"I As soon as any part of a person's conduct affects prejudicially the interests
of others, society has jurisdiction over it, and the question whether the general
welfare will or will not be promoted by interfering with it becomes open to
discussion. But there is no room for entertaimng any such question when
a person's conduct affects the interests of no persons besides himself, or
needs not affect them unless they like. In all such cases, there should
be perfect freedom, legal and social, to do the action and- stand the
consequences.
J. MIL, supra note 157, at 92.
In The strict scrutiny approach had its ongin in cases involving racial discrimina-
tion. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 10-12 (1967).
11 The intermediate approach had its origin in cases involving gender discrimina-
tion. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-99 (1976).
1:9 See Loving, 388 U.S. at 10-12.
"I Craig, 429 U.S. at 197.
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Because the right of intimate association encompassed within
the right to the pursuit of happiness as protected by the ninth
amendment 192 could be deemed fundamental,19 3 and because
restrictions on fundamental rights generally are reviewed by
the Court under the strict scrutiny standard when challenged
under the equal protection clause, 194 the strict scrutiny standard
should be employed to measure a restriction on a fundamental
right when challenged under the ninth amendment. 195 However,
assuming arguendo that the application of the strict scrutiny
standard would be inappropriate,' 96 the intermediate standard
will be employed here to determine whether sodomy statutes
are constitutional under this interpretation of the ninth amend-
ment. 19
7
Various justifications have been advanced to identify the
state's interests served by sodomy statutes. Among these al-
leged justifications are "the preservation of the family,' 1 98 the
preservation of the institution of marriage,' 99 the protection of
children from child molestation, 200 the protection of moral-
ity,201 respect for the moral teachings of history, 20 2 and/or the
protection of the public against harm.20 3 All of these are ar-
guably "important," perhaps even "compelling," state inter-
" See supra notes 167-71 and accompanying text.
191 B. PATTERSON, supra note 49, at 52-54.
191 See supra note 16 for the text of the equal protection clause.
191 The interests of an individual in his or her own fundamental rights should not
depend on which constitutional provision is relied upon. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 106
S. Ct. 2841, 2848-50 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
'1 But see supra note 195.
197 Of course, if such statutes fail to pass muster under the intermediate approach,
they necessarily would fail under the strict scrutiny approach.
'" See Delgado, Fact, Norm, and Standard of Review-The Case of Homosexual-
ity, 10 U. DAYTON L. REv 575, 585-88 (1985).
11 See Richards, Sexual Autonomy and the Constitutional Right to Privacy: A
Case Study in Human Rights and the Unwritten Constitution, 30 HAsTiNs L.J. 957,
993-995 (1979).
21 See supra note 198.
2' See Delgado, supra note 198, at 590-91.
202 See Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. at 2847 (Burger, J., concurring).
2' See People v. Onofore, 415 N.E.2d 936, 943 (1980) (holding that penal law
which criminalizes consensual sodomy violates constitutional rights of privacy and equal
protection "because it permits the same conduct between persons married to each
other. ").
[VOL. 76
1987-88] BOWERS V HARDWICK
ests, 20 4 yet it is highly unlikely that these interests will be
substantially furthered 25 by the proscription of consensual sex-
ual acts between gay persons. 206 The proscription of private
consensual sexual acts cannot reasonably be said to be "sub-
stantially related" (and certainly not "necessary") to the ad-
vancement of these interests. 20 7 Therefore, failing to meet the
requisite standard, sodomy statutes would be unconstitutional
under the ninth amendment as interpreted under this approach.
CONCLUSION
In Bowers v Hardwick,208 the Supreme Court held that
sodomy statutes are not unconstitutional under the due process
2' See supra notes 201-03. A question exists as to whether all of these rise to the
level of being "important" governmental objectives, as opposed to being merely "per-
missible." The protection of morality and maintaimng respect for the moral teachings
of history are the least likely to rise to this level. Cf. Mississippi Univ. for Women v.
Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725 (1982) (if "statutory objective reflects archaic and
stereotypic notions" it is likely that "the statutory objective itself is illegitimate"); Sail'er
Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 485 P.2d 529, 541-43 (Cal. 1971) (justification based on protection
of morality insufficient to sustain statute).
m Depending on the justification for the statute put forward by the state, sodomy
statutes might well fail to pass the rational basis test-the most deferential standard of
judicial review. For example, prohibiting consensual sexual acts between gay persons can
hardly be said to be "rationally related" to protecting children against sexual molestation.
20 Of the proffered justifications, the only ones that could possibly be "substantially
furthered" by sodomy statutes are respect for the teachings of history and, arguably, the
protection of morality. See supra note 204. As to the other alleged justification, the very
fact that homosexuals are unlikely to marry and that even those who do marry are not
automatically converted into heterosexuals refutes any assertion that sodomy statutes are
substantially related to preserving marriage and the family. With regard to "protecting the
public" as a justification, there is no evidence that prohibiting consensual sexual relations
between gay persons reduces the amount of tangible harm to society. Finally, because child
molestation is, by operation of law, involuntary on the part of the child, prohibiting
consensual sexual acts has no relationship to this objective. Therefore, the substantial
relationship prong of the test is not met for any of the proferred justifications for sodomy
statutes.
1w See Gay Student Serv. v. Texas A & M Umv., 737 F.2d 1317, 1329-33 (5th Cir.
1984) (holding that state university's refusal to recognize officially gay student's group was
not supported by a "compelling interest"); Baker v. Wade, 553 F Supp. 1121, 1143 (N.D.
Tex. 1982), rev'd, 769 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding that § 21.06 of Texas statutes
prohibiting homosexual conduct between consenting adults "is not justified by any 'com-
pelling state interest' "); Gay Students Org. of the Umv. of New Hampshire v. Bonner,
367 F Supp. 1088, 1096-1101 (D.N.H. 1974) (holding that "[a]bsent the attendance of well-
defined circumstances, a university must recognize any bona fide student organization");
Onofore, 415 N.E.2d at 943; see also Delgado, supra note 198, at 585-91.
- 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986).
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clause of the fourteenth amendment. 20 9 The Court left open
the question of whether such statutes were valid under the
ninth amendment. 210 The scope of the ninth amendment with
respect to state action has yet to be defined by the Supreme
Court. 21' However, there have been at least four approaches
to interpreting the ninth amendment. 212 The first applies the
ninth amendment by analogy to state action through the due
process clause. 2 3 The second views the ninth amendment as
containing a penumbra that, in conjunction with the penum-
bras of other constitutional provisions, and applied to the
states through the due process clause, helps to create a consti-
tutionally protected right to privacy 214 The third views the
ninth amendment as being directly applicable to the states
through its incorporation into the fourteenth amendment. 215
The fourth approach views the ninth amendment as having
been directly applicable to the states from its inception. 21 6
Under the first three interpretations of the ninth amendment,
it is highly unlikely that sodomy statutes violate the ninth
amendment. 217 Under the fourth interpretation, sodomy stat-
utes, as applied to consensual sexual activity, are an unconsti-
tutional violation of the individual rights protected by the ninth
amendment. 218
John R. Hamilton
2 Id. at 2843.
210 Id. at 2846 n.8.
211 See supra notes 34-42 and accompanying text.
212 See supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text.
213 See supra notes 52-59 and accompanying text.
214 See supra notes 6069 and accompanying text.
211 See supra notes 70-75 and accompanying text.
216 See supra notes 76-81 and accompanying text.
217 See supra notes 82-118 and accompanying text.
218 See supra notes 119-207 and accompanying text.
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